Commentary on: Manfred Kraus\u27  Arguing or Reasoning? Argumentation in rhetorical context by Henkemans, A. Francisca Snoeck
University of Windsor 
Scholarship at UWindsor 
OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 10 
May 22nd, 9:00 AM - May 25th, 5:00 PM 
Commentary on: Manfred Kraus' "Arguing or Reasoning? 
Argumentation in rhetorical context" 
A. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans 
University of Amsterdam, Department of Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory, and Rhetoric 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive 
 Part of the Philosophy Commons 
Henkemans, A. Francisca Snoeck, "Commentary on: Manfred Kraus' "Arguing or Reasoning? 
Argumentation in rhetorical context"" (2013). OSSA Conference Archive. 98. 
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA10/papersandcommentaries/98 
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences and Conference Proceedings at 
Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized 
conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca. 
Mohammed, D., & Lewiński, M. (Eds.). Virtues of Argumentation. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario 
Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 22-26 May 2013. Windsor, ON: OSSA, pp. 1-2. 
Commentary on: Manfred Kraus’ “Arguing or Reasoning? 
Argumentation in Rhetorical Context” 
 
A. FRANCISCA SNOECK HENKEMANS 
 
Department of Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric 
University of Amsterdam 
Spuistraat 134 
1012 VB Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
a.f.snoeckhenkemans@uva.nl 
 
 
Kraus proposes a convincing dialogical analysis of rhetorical texts that are 
presented by a speaker to a non-interactive audience. By thus analyzing rhetorical 
texts, he attempts to resolve “the apparent contradiction between a fundamentally 
dialogical concept of argumentation and the presence of argumentation in rhetorical 
texts”. The problem is, however, that such an analysis of monological discourse has 
already been given by argumentation theorists favoring a dialogical approach to 
argumentation.1 His analysis seems, for instance, to be completely in line with the 
view taken in pragma-dialectics on the dialogical character of monologues, as the 
following quote by van Eemeren and Grootendorst shows: 
 
The pragma-dialectical argumentation theory assumes that, in principle, 
argumentative language is always part of an exchange of views between two parties 
that do not hold the same opinion, even when the exchange of views takes place by 
way of a monologue. The monologue is then taken to be a specific kind of critical 
discussion where the protagonist is speaking (or writing) and the role of the 
antagonist remains implicit. Even if the role of the antagonist is not actively and 
explicitly performed, the discourse of the protagonist can still be analyzed as a 
contribution to a critical discussion: The protagonist makes an attempt to counter 
(potential) doubt or criticism of a specific or non-specific audience or readership 
(2004, p. 59). 
 
In their monograph Argumentation, Communication and Fallacies which was 
published in 1992, van Eemeren and Grootendorst introduce the term “implicit 
discussion” for discursive texts that appear to be a monologue at first sight. They 
justify their analysis of monological texts as an implicit discussion as follows: 
 
A speaker or writer who is intent on resolving a dispute will have to take just as 
much account of implicit doubt about his standpoint as of doubt that has been 
expressed explicitly. He may also deal with doubt that is purely imaginary. The 
presumed antagonist need not even exist, as when the speaker or writer imagines 
                                                          
1 Kraus maintains that monologues should be distinguished from solo performances, because he 
believes that in the case of monologues there is no audience. In ordinary usage, however, the term 
‘monologue’ is more commonly used to refer to longer stretches of talk by a speaker addressed at a  
listener or group of listeners that do not interrupt the speaker.  It is in this latter sense that I use the 
term ‘monologue’ here. 
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how his standpoint might be received by a skeptical listener or reader. Then he is 
anticipating possible doubt. His argumentative discourse is in all these cases, as it 
were, part of a real or imagined implicit discussion (1992, p. 43). 
 
Kraus’ remark that in dialogical approaches such as pragma-dialectics “dialogue is 
assumed to be a necessary condition for argumentation” thus needs to be made 
more precise: in a dialogical approach to argumentation, it should be possible to 
reconstruct the argumentative discourse as a dialogue, but it is not necessary for the 
discourse to be explicitly dialogical.  
 In the pragma-dialectical theory, the protagonist’s argumentation is seen as a 
complex whole made up of statements put forward to deal with real or anticipated 
critical reactions from an antagonist (Snoeck Henkemans, 1992, p. 19). Kraus’ 
assumption that “the idea of a hidden dialogue structure of rhetorical texts might 
even be reconcilable with the pragma-dialectical model” is therefore completely 
justified. But unlike Kraus suggests, this was already the case within the standard 
pragma-dialectical theory, that is, before the integration of a rhetorical component 
into the theory, just as it has always been possible to make a distinction between the 
ideal model of a critical discussion and cases of argumentation as they occur in 
practice.  
Van Eemeren and Houtlosser chose to add a rhetorical dimension to the 
theoretical frame-work of pragma-dialectics in order to make it possible to account 
for the strategic design of argumentative discourse (van Eemeren, 2012, p. 440). 
Next to the dimension of reasonableness predominant in the pragma-dialectical 
standard theory they thus incorporated the dimension of effectiveness in their 
theorizing (van Eemeren, 2012, p. 441). That their theory still has a dialectical basis, 
and is not intended as a fully rhetorical theory is explicitly recognized by van 
Eemeren: 
 
Far from subsuming all of rhetoric, in pragma-dialectics insights from rhetoric are 
only used in so far as they are of help in the analysis and evaluation of strategic 
manoeuvring. The scope of rhetoric is, of course, much broader, and utilizing 
rhetorical insights for this specific purpose in a dialectical framework of analysis 
leaves rhetoric as such untouched (van Eemeren, 2012, p. 446). 
 
In sum, I believe that even though the dialogical analysis of  rhetorical discourse 
presented by Kraus is in itself completely defensible, some of the starting-points 
underlying the attempt at giving such an analysis are untenable. 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Eemeren, F. H. van (2012). The pragma-dialectical theory under discussion. Argumentation, 26, 439-
457. 
Eemeren, F. H. van & Grootendorst, R. (1992). Argumentation, communication and fallacies; A 
pragma-dialectical perspective. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Eemeren, F. H. van & Grootendorst, R. (2004). A systematic theory of argumentation. The pragma-
dialectical approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Snoeck Henkemans, A. F. (1992). Analysing complex argumentation; The reconstruction of multiple 
and coordinatively compound argumentation in a critical discussion. Amsterdam: Sicsat. 
